Exhibit E

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     IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
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 2
     BETWEEN
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     ALFREDO SERRANO, BRIAN PATRICK
                                           )
     THOMAS, DANIEL G. RAUP, DEAN HEIL,
 4
 5
     et al.,
                                           )
             Claimants.
                                           )
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 7
                                           ) No. 22-02150
       VS.
     MORGAN STANLEY,
                                           ) c/w 22-02147
 8
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             Respondent.
                                           )
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             TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS had at the
12
     arbitration of the above-entitled matter, held at
13
     55 West Monroe, Suite 2600, Chicago, Illinois, on
     the 29th day of February, 2024, commencing at
14
15
     9:00 a.m.
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17
     BEFORE:
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     MARK W. SOLOCK, Umpire
     ALLEN GREENBERG, Arbitrator
19
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     Caroline W. Harney, Arbitrator
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     Reported by: Cynthia J. Conforti, CSR, CRR
     License No. 084-003064
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Page 6 issues before we start? 1 2 MR. GOLDSHAW: No. 3 ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: Then, Counsel, you can 4 proceed to your closing argument. 5 MR. GOLDSHAW: Thank you. CLOSING ARGUMENT OF CLAIMANTS 6 7 The vesting periods were MR. GOLDSHAW: too long. They were not permitted by ERISA. 8 9 In my opening statement, I was careful to 10 state our claim clearly because I didn't want the question before this panel to be confused or lost 11 in the proceedings. 12 13 Did Morgan Stanley break the law when they canceled deferred compensation awards to claimants 14 15 by relying on the long vesting periods in their 16 deferred compensation plan? 17 ERISA protects employees; that's the 18 purpose of the statute. One of the ways it protects employees is by setting maximum limits to 19 20 vesting periods, and Morgan Stanley's plan 21 exceeded them. So if ERISA applies to Morgan Stanley's 22 23 deferred compensation plan, it's illegal. 24 ERISA applies, the vesting schedule in the plan is

too long. The law has been decided on that.

There is a federal court opinion directly on point. It addresses the exact same deferred compensation plan that we have discussed this week, and in that plan, the vesting periods exceed the maximum limits set forth in ERISA.

The opinion issued by Judge Gardephe this last November is directly on point. It holds, and I quote from the opinion: "Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation programs are ERISA plans."

That's the law.

Throughout this entire hearing, Morgan Stanley has been trying to distract from the law. They have done that by mischaracterizing our claims and by flooding the panel with repetitive testimony and irrelevant documents that have nothing to do with whether their plan is governed by ERISA. So to state our argument again, as in the Shafer case decided by Judge Gardephe, we are arguing under subsection 2 of the ERISA statute.

Morgan Stanley's arguments that its plan was not set up as a retirement plan under subsection 1 are irrelevant. Their attempt to distract and confuse, just ignore them. They're

Page 8 not part of our claims. 1 2 Under subsection 2, which is the only 3 subsection at issue here, what matters is the plan documents, how it works, and what payments result from it. 5 A deferred compensation plan is covered by 6 7 ERISA pursuant to the statute itself if -- we have highlighted the language of subsection 2 that we 8 9 are under, if it, quote: Results in a deferral of income by 10 11 employees for periods extending to the termination 12 of covered employment or beyond, end quote. 13 We'll be happy to provide copies of what you see on the screen afterwards, after the 14 15 closing statements. So the standard that is the focus is 16 17 whether Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation 18 plan results in a deferral of income by employees 19 for periods extending to the termination of 20 covered employment or beyond. 21

There can be no doubt, as the Court found in Shafer, that Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation plan results in a deferral of income to employees to the period of separation or

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23

24

beyond.

As Judge Gardephe found in Shafer, looking at the plan documents itself, there are several paths the plan provides that result in payments to employees at or after the time of separation. And they include, as a reminder, if the employee retires from the industry, separates employment due to death or disability, takes certain kinds of governmental preference or is terminated involuntarily during a layoff.

All of those paths under the plan lead to the payment of income to employees at the time of the separation or beyond. And that's enough. That's what the statute provides. That's what subsection 2 provides, and that's what Judge Gardephe found when reviewing the exact same plan that the panel is here this week to analyze.

Under ERISA to determine if a plan is governed by ERISA, the decider has to look to the plan documents itself. It is the plan that is governed by ERISA or not. It's not actions or communication -- that doesn't determine whether something is governed by ERISA. It's the plan.

And because we wanted to make this clear,

Page 10

we have cases -- we'll provide it in the cite.

These cases provide that the decision is based on the express terms of the plan. And if the express terms of the plan provide pathways for payments to occur at or after the termination of employment, the plan documents are all that are needed to be considered.

Courts decide these matters, as a matter of law, without submitting them to triers of fact when the plan documents themselves, as they are here, provide for these pathways to payment for separation of employment and beyond. That's what Judge Gardephe found in his decision.

Now, Morgan Stanley has tried hard to minimize this by suggesting in various ways that the plan didn't result in all that many payments to separated employees.

And first off, in so doing, they are relying on evidence outside the plan documents, and so this is already afoul. We don't need to look beyond the plan to know if the plan is governed by ERISA.

But even more so, they haven't been exactly straight with you in how they have

Page 11

presented that evidence, and so I want to show you what I mean.

Let's take a look at their first exhibit,
Respondent's Exhibit 1. This is the document they
used to calculate percentages. And what I
encourage you to look at is the column highlighted
in yellow. And what you will see is this shows
that this plan, in fact, resulted in large
payments to separated employees.

Every year tens of millions of dollars under this plan were paid out to employees at or after the time of separation of employment. This is a plan that clearly results in payment in the millions, tens of millions of dollars, to employees at or after the separation of employment. It is governed by ERISA. End of story.

Since 2015, where our claims are faced, there has been \$243 million by their own documents paid to employees at or after the separation of employment. That's almost a quarter of a billion dollars, with a B. Are they seriously contending a quarter of a billion dollars is de minimis? You should look past that?

And Morgan Stanley also had an expert witness prepare a chart, and I'd like to show you that chart.

'19.

This is Exhibit 4, Respondent's Exhibit 4.

And this is the chart where they show the red column, and it states only 14.7 percent of payments under the MSCIP, the MSCIP, were paid to separated employees.

First off, I can't help but note that's a lot of money and that's enough for coverage, but let's see how they presented this evidence by looking back at the underlying data and seeing what they did. They watered down the numbers by looking back to periods that our claims do not relate to. They look beyond 2015.

Let's take a look. This is the same

Exhibit 1 I showed you. I put brackets around it so you can see where I'm focused. That's the part that deals with -- if you see all the way on the left -- are you able to see the numbers or should I read them?

ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: [Nonverbal response.]

MR. GOLDSHAW: Okay. 2015, '16, '17 '18,

If you look at the bracketed numbers and you

do the math, it's not 14.7 percent. The number jumps to almost 20 percent. It's 19.9 percent to be exact.

That means, to be very clear, that according to their own documents from the year 2015 onward, which is where our case is focused on -- and we get to decide where we are focused on our case. We are focused on 2015 forward.

And if you look at those numbers instead of the numbers that Morgan Stanley tried to present you going back way beyond the period, their own numbers confirm approximately 20 percent of all the money paid under the MSCIP went to employees at or after the time of separation of employment. That's significant, especially when that 20 percent means nearly a quarter of a billion, with a B, dollars.

Morgan Stanley also tried to show that only a small percentage, single digits of -- or something like this. I think it was that or not much more -- of the total compensation package to FAs went into the deferred compensation plan.

What does that have to do with anything? ERISA has no relationship to what percentage of

Page 14 the total amount of an employee's compensation 1 2 goes into a covered plan. In fact, it's quite 3 normal. There's nothing unusual about ERISA plans to constitute a small percentage of employees' 5 That's what ERISA protects. income. You can't violate ERISA just because it 6 7 only violates a small percentage, a relatively small percentage of an employee's total income. 8 9 There's nothing in the law like that. 10 Now, I also want to say that Morgan 11 Stanley, forgive me for saying, hasn't been 12 exactly straight in its arguments that the post 13 2015 deferred compensation was a bonus. Recall when Mr. Kemp was testifying, what 14 15 he said, and I quote, is: "You can think of it as 16 a bonus," end quote. 17 And his careful word choice gives him 18 away. 19 Now, he said these words: "You can think 20 of it as a bonus," after our claims were filed 21 challenging the legality of the deferred 22 compensation plans under ERISA. 23 And what's going on here is that Morgan 24 Stanley has made legal arguments to try to argue

that these deferred compensation of words are somehow a bonus because under the law, there's a higher legal standard that applies to bonus.

They want to take advantage of this higher legal standard, and if you note, virtually all of the cases on this issue that they have cited are bonus cases dealing with analysis of bonus, which is not this case.

Judge Gardephe reviewed and found as a matter of law -- let me get this quote right.

Quote, not my words, his, quote:

The deferred compensation programs at issue here are not bonus programs, end quote.

This is clear unequivocal language from a federal court which is an authority -- which is the authority on this issue. His decision is the law.

Now, Morgan Stanley has tried to suggest that this panel shouldn't follow the Shafer decision that holds that ERISA governs its plan by saying -- I think the words were something like, oh, all you need to know about it is it's dicta. It's not dicta.

Dicta is an extraneous comment that a

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Court might make in an opinion or something that's not central to its holding. That's what dicta is.

Let's take a look at the Shafer decision.

Now, what I've done because I'm aware you're viewing from a distance, is in your exhibit binders, it's in dual-column format. It's a little hard to read. This is the actual opinion signed by him. It's the same words, just a little easier to read instead of dual column.

Yes, so let me first show you, because we talked a lot about this. I am not going to review this very long decision with you, I promise. Go all the way up. It's a long decision. You can see on the top right, we are talking 56 pages, right?

So here it is. So you can see at the top, this is that Matthew T. Shafer v. Morgan Stanley. Top right, Memorandum Opinion Order. This is the judge's order, okay?

Judge Paul Gardephe. If you allow me, I'm going to try to make this a little faster. I want to make sure you can see. If you skip to the bottom, last page. Here's his conclusion. He signed it November 21st.

Page 17

There it is, Judge Gardephe. It's signed, right? United States District Judge. This is the Shafer decision.

Now, it's a long decision. I want to start at the part where the analysis occurs that we have been talking about this week.

So here's where -- I start on page 26.

Obviously, read whatever you want. If you want to read the other parts of the opinion, I am not hiding anything.

But here, on page 28, is where it gets interesting for this case. They talk about how plaintiff's contention is that this is an ERISA plan, and Morgan Stanley's arguing in this case that because of the arbitration agreements -- the same one that brought us here, that this case should be brought not as a class action, but it has to be like arbitration. That's what the fight is about, a motion about whether this should go to arbitration or not.

So here we go. We are looking at the opinion. There's a lot in here. It's considering -- he's describing why he needs to reach this. And here I'll highlight this:

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That in considering the arguments regarding whether this should go to arbitration -- can you see my cursor moving around? I wish I had one of those laser pointers.

ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: [Nonverbal response.]

MR. GOLDSHAW: The Court must first

determine whether (1) the compensation incentive plan and the equity incentive plan -- that's the MSCIP and the EICP are ERISA plans.

The judge is saying it's important to his decision to make this ruling.

He goes -- it would take me more than an hour to go over all this. So this is not meant -- because I would love for you all to read this opinion, believe me, but I'm going to try to highlight to guide your way through a little bit.

He then talks about whether the deferred compensation plans are ERISA plans, not dicta.

This is the point he's addressing. And this, by the way, was after he specifically asked the parties in this case, including

Morgan Stanley, to provide legal briefing on the issue of whether the plans were ERISA plans. So everyone had a full and fair opportunity to make

their arguments to this federal judge because he said this is what I'm going to look at.

Whether the deferred compensation plans are ERISA plans, he's citing the law. Here's the applicable law. There's a long discussion on the statute and all these cases, including lots of the cases that respondent is relying on now. Here are all these cases that he's reviewing. This is not just a quickie decision, right?

He's talking about the CFR and the statute and the cases, that he's doing a survey from all these places around the country. See, I know these cases. I want to talk about all of them, but I'm going to keep this moving.

In the Tolbert opinion, he's talking about that one, which we've talked. He's still going on in the decision before he eventually gets to...

He talks about here in Subsection B, whether plaintiffs' deferred compensation programs are bonus plans.

I point this out because I want the panel to understand, when I quote the Shafer decision, that Judge Gardephe found these are not bonus plans. It was not a throwaway line. It is a

separate section and analysis of his opinion.

He goes forward looking at the plans themselves, which, as I've already explained, is the area focused to decide if it's governed by ERISA, you look at the plans. He's not looking at extraneous information. He's looking at the plan documents to see the results in the deferral payment at or after the time of separation of employment.

So this is where concludes the deferred compensation programs at issue here are not bonus plans. He discusses Morgan Stanley's arguments. The same arguments we're making to you here, he rejected those.

He's talking about the case law, how other courts have decided. He's doing a thorough analysis and finding these are not bonus plans.

And then he gets to the issue, which is the ultimate issue of course, of whether the deferred compensation plans result in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond.

After a week with me, you'll probably be able to cite that phrase in your sleep, but that's

Page 21 because this is where the ball game is, right? 1 2 It's talking about the definition of 3 He's explained that this is coming from -- and this is in answer to one of the two 4 questions, I believe, that the panelists have 5 asked us to address. 6 7 He is specifically analyzing where does this money come from? Is it a bonus? 8 9 He says: No, it comes from their commissions. 10 11 The grid. The grid. Remember, Morgan 12 Stanley spent a lot of time, I contend, trying to 13 confuse the issue by saying: Oh, we're trying to simplify. We have all these grids before 2015. 14 15 We're condensing. And they said: We had to make 16 a couple tweaks to make it fit like a jigsaw. 17 Maybe that's more complicated than I can 18 understand. I'm not focused on that. 19 When you look at 2015, that's the document 20 where these awards were granted. They come from 21 commissions, the witness testimony, the documents are clear, and Judge Gardephe found that. 22 23 Because the grid calculates the money, and 24 it says what percentage gets paid out now. And

Page 22

then there's a separate column which tells what percentage would go to deferred comp coming from the commissions in the incentive comp part of the plan.

And notably, I think Judge Gardephe, mentions, but you can see for yourselves, that plan document has a separate section on bonuses, and that's not where it's coming from. That's an attempt to confuse, respectfully. This, oh, it could be thought of as a bonus.

Judge Gardephe finds, as is here, and this is where I've quoted before: Both at the deferred compensation programs resulted in the deferral of income -- I'm not going to say the same language over and over -- and after the reasons stated above, which remember, is like ten pages worth of analysis, the reason stated above, he is talking about that.

This Court concludes that Morgan Stanley's deferred compensation programs are ERISA plans.

Period, full stop. Federal court has made the ruling.

I mean, in short -- I can take this down for now, and we can get back to some other slides.

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In short, I mean, Shafer is a very thorough, analytical detailed opinion by a prestigious federal judge, Judge Gardephe. Not that all judges aren't prestigious, but he's a particularly prestigious one, that he delves into the plan documents, he does the analysis, he gives the parties a chance to argue, and Morgan Stanley lost. Their plan is covered by ERISA. That is the law. That's the law.

Now, Morgan Stanley has tried to suggest in some subtle ways as well that this panel disregard the law in this case. And I want to review them, because, again, my big concern here is to avoid confusion and keep the focus of what is the issue actually before this panel as we, the claimants, decide, because we bring the claims, right? We get to decide what the issue is we are presenting based on our claims.

I want to point out ways that -- was there --

ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: No.

MR. GOLDSHAW: I thought there was a question.

One, they put forth two prior FINRA

arbitrations that they contend involve similar issues that they won. These are decisions that occurred before Judge Gardephe issued Shafer.

Those panels did not have a binding legal ruling that these plans are governed by ERISA.

And plus, because of the nature of FINRA arbitration awards, I don't have a complaint with it. I'm just pointing out, there's not a reasoned decision, so there's no way to tell what led those panels to the decision they did.

Even if -- regardless, though, they did not have a federal law compelling their finding that ERISA governs these plans.

Two, Morgan Stanley has put forth a lot of evidence to try to show that the claimants earned a lot of money and they grew their business at Morgan Stanley.

Again, what does that have to do with whether Morgan Stanley set up a deferred compensation plan with vesting periods that didn't comply with ERISA? It's nothing. It has nothing to do with it. Morgan Stanley's plans stand or fall on their own terms. They apply equally no matter how much money the claimants did or did not

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make, or whether they made money at Morgan Stanley for which they were paid, and by the way, for which they provided value. That's why Morgan Stanley was paying them.

It's not like Morgan Stanley didn't get a share in the deal too, right? They benefitted from the arrangement. But none of that has anything to doing with whether the vesting periods are too long under ERISA, under their plans. It is a pure distraction.

They have similarly put forth lots of testimony about how recruiting is done to suggest they need to consider cancellation of deferred compensation awards as part of negotiations. Very general statements. Nobody has any knowledge of what happened during the claimants' negotiations, and I point out there's no evidence that any of the claimants actually negotiated for an offset.

But the idea here, if I could try to state it more clearly than I just did, is that they seem to be arguing, oh, you shouldn't care if we violated claimants' ERISA rights because they made up for it by negotiating good packages with their next employer.

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That has absolutely nothing to do with the law. Under the law, if an employer fails to make a payment, they're required to make the payment. If someone negotiates for a very high-paying job afterwards, that doesn't excuse an employer from making the payments it was required to make that the employee earned. It is a non sequitur. There is no law on that point, and it is essentially an argument that the panel disregard the law which does not provide for an offset in the way that they seem to be arguing.

They have been very good with some of their word choices. They talk about these exceptions as humanitarian exceptions. I don't want to go down into the ditch and argue if they're humanitarian or if they serve a purpose for Morgan Stanley as well, et cetera, because ERISA doesn't care. I know I'm sounding like a broken record -- I hope not -- but ERISA doesn't care what you call the exceptions.

They call -- is there a pathway to payment to employees at the time of separation or beyond? And there's no doubt whether you label it a humanitarian exception or not, 20 percent of the

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payments, as we saw when you did the data that they put up the correct way by focusing on the years that they're supposed to, about 20 percent, for whatever reason you call it, went to employees at or after the term of the separation of employment, and the title you give it or the reasons you wanted to do it is of no relevance under ERISA. ERISA focuses on the plan and the results.

Now, Morgan Stanley has also seemed to try to argue that they needed to have these long vesting periods to make the regulators happy.

They all seem to be suggesting that they can get to regulatory problems or not comply with federal regulations if they abide by ERISA.

That is complete nonsense. No federal regulator is requiring Morgan Stanley to break the ERISA law. And if you noticed when Mr. Kemp was asked about it on cross-examination, he confessed that the topic of ERISA never came up. No regulator ever asked them to violate ERISA.

There's been no explanation as to why -- and to be clear, we are saying they could have a deferred comp plan. It just has to have ERISA-compliant

vesting schedules. They did not do it.

So this argument of "woe is me, we are just trying to make sure that our investors don't commit fraud, and we want to make the regulators happy is complete nonsense.

Let me point out employers have a wide array of devices at their disposal to make sure their employees abide by rules and abide by codes of ethics. Their playing employers without long, non-ERISA-compliant, vesting schedules where their employees are good stewards of the company, don't violate codes of ethics, abide by the law. And, yes, you can fire employees for doing for doing this conduct. So this argument is really quite a distraction, and I wanted to point out, shine the flashlight, on why it makes no sense at all.

Same with their argument about employee retention. They're really arguing that they need to create these long vesting periods to create financial disincentives so they can retain their employees. Well, how about retaining the employees for legal reasons, by providing a good work environment, paying them well, treating them fairly, providing a brand name that helps them

grow their business.

The idea that to retain employees you need to violate ERISA is again absurd. It is not part of the law, and I will call it out. It is an attempt to try to put pressure, psychological pressure, on the panel to look the other way for their violating ERISA because you feel bad, "oh, woe is me. We need to keep our financial advisers." That is a ridiculous argument, and it is not warranted by law. It is a distraction from the law.

They have also subtly, I believe, tried to create the impression that oh, we are just doing what everyone else is doing, and we need to stay competitive and everyone else is doing it. Well, there's so many ways to go after that argument it's hard to know where to start, but let me start by saying that this panel need not be concerned that there's going to be some sea change in the industry if it rules in claimant's favor.

If there's a sea change, Judge Gardephe already did that. He put an opinion out there that is the law. It's widely available. So as much clout and respect as I have for the panel, I

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don't think that this panel's decision is going to put the industry over the edge in how it handles its deferred compensation schedule vesting.

And I will point out that it didn't, you know, even before Judge Gardephe, Wells Fargo had to pay -- made headlines. It was all over the news about making \$79 million in payments for settling ERISA claims. If you're interested, publicly available documents. The witness was wrong. Wells Fargo did claim the argument that it wasn't governed by ERISA. He was wrong about that, and that's something that if anyone finds important could easily take judicial notice of that.

But in addition to trying to get the panel to disregard the law, Morgan Stanley this week has tried to distract you with lots and lots of totally irrelevant evidence, none of which goes to: Does the plan result in a payment of income to employees at separation or beyond?

Were the plans' vesting schedules too long under ERISA? And did Morgan Stanley cancel claimant's deferred compensation awards by relying on the illegally long vesting provisions?

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How much of their evidence went to those issues which are the questions that guide this decision? Almost all of the evidence that Morgan Stanley presented goes to the various irrelevant arguments that I've already mentioned, plus a couple of straw man arguments that they introduced that we didn't.

In Morgan Stanley's opening statement on Monday, I've been waiting three days to get a chance to argue and address the panel to correct this. They badly misrepresented our claims.

You will recall that I made a big point at the very beginning of my opening statement of saying I want to be very clear on what we are claiming here. You recall that at the prehearing conference ten days before the hearing, we said what the claims are. We narrowed our claims.

It's not unusual, before a hearing, we you start out, you make a claim, you cast it broad, you get some discovery, decide what claims you want to pursue, you narrow. That's what we did. And in order to have a launching point for lots and lots of evidence about things such as, oh, the claimants understood the plan. We made

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disclosures. We have never argued in this hearing that the claimants should win because they didn't understand the plan terms or it wasn't communicated.

It wasn't part of my opening statement.

It wasn't part of our arguments. None of our witnesses testified to it. They kept parading witnesses and documents to show how clearly the terms of the plan were communicated.

And let me be clear, because I have to keep coming back to this: Our contention is not that the claimants did not understand the plan or contentions that the plan is illegal, as a matter of law, because the vesting periods are too long. The vesting periods are too long. That's it.

ERISA does not allow those long vesting periods.

It doesn't matter if they're communicated to the employees. It doesn't matter if the employees agree to them. The employees don't have the right to overall rule ERISA any more than the employer does. This is all a big distraction, almost as if to say that, oh, the claimants understood the deal. They made a lot of money. You shouldn't worry about the law. That is not

the role of the panel of arbitrators. It is to apply the law, and the law is settled.

Again, all of this had the launching point, not on my statements, but on Morgan Stanley's statements in opening as to what we were arguing. We get to say what we are arguing, not them. We did not say that that was our case, and that should be completely disregarded and recognized for the distraction that it is.

The other severe mischaracterization of our claims that was made in Morgan Stanley's opening statement is they actually said that we conceded that Morgan Stanley's deferral of compensation plans were legal before 2015. That is absurd. We have never said that. Why would anybody say that anyway, even if they thought it was true? What they're saying is they are trying to hook on to the fact that we chose to assert our claims by focusing on the period of 2015 forward.

That is not the same as saying, "and we concede that prior to 2015, we agree that was all lawful." And then they try to say, well, if prior to 2015, if it was lawful, well, there's not much

1 difference between what happened before and after.

2 | That is a complete huge snowball of a distraction.

Why are you looking at the plan before 2015 if

that's not what our claims are based on?

If they really can stand behind the legality of their plans starting in 2015, there's no need for them to make this roundabout argument, oh, well, instead of looking at 2015, let's look at before. We'll prove that's legal, and it's not too different, so this is legal.

What is that? That is a very indirect path to argument, and it is, again, based on a severe mischaracterization of the claims that I tried very hard to very clearly state what we were claiming, and that it was mischaracterized, and it is the launching pad for lots and lots of irrelevant evidence about what changes to the plan took place.

Now, I can tell you that -- forgive me. I think I might have gone out of order in my slides.

One of the other reasons that they are focused on the period prior to 2015 relates to Morgan Stanley realizing or deciding that it's an advantage for them to try to characterize these

deferred compensation awards that were taken out of the commissions and try to cast them as like a bonus, right?

So let's look at -- we had a lot of these examples -- or a number, I should say, but let's look at just one to remind the panel of what I'm talking about of how Morgan Stanley characterized these awards before they knew about our claims that they were violating ERISA, and before they decided to try to argue they were bonuses.

So let's take a look. These are the descriptions of the canceled awards. This is back to one of our claims. And if you notice, prior to 2015, we have highlighted where they are describing these awards as bonuses. That's what they did before 2015.

But come 2015, after what they claim were inconsequential changes to the plan, they go silent. These aren't bonuses. They come from where? Incentive compensation. 2015, incentive compensation, 2016.

This is for the ES, for the EICP, the ones on shares. I don't want you to think we are hiding the ball. Let's look at the ones for the

Page 36 cash. This is the MSCIP. You can see that's on 1 2 the left. 3 Here we go again: 2009, '10, '11, '12. They have bonus, bonus, bonus, bonus. I quess it 4 starts at '10: Bonus, bonus, bonus, bonus. 5 And then we come to 2015, where supposedly 6 7 nothing changed. Remember, same as it ever was, right? Well, not in their own documents. 8 9 All of a sudden, those bonuses are incentive compensation, which is what we have been 10 11 arquing all along. 12 And so, again, I want to remind, and I 13 hope I am making clear to the panel, the only reason any of this is coming up is because Morgan 14 15 Stanley has mischaracterized our claims as stating that the plans were legal before 2015, and we did 16 17 not. 18 I want to show you why they're doing it. We did not and in truth, it should not matter 19 20 because as the claimants, we have the right to 21 assert the claims that we want. 22 I did want to talk about damages, 23 including the panel's question regarding 24 attorneys' fees on damages.

2.4

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Yes, so let's first start with the document that was presented this morning and admitted into evidence, right? I wasn't there for the proceeding, the affidavit from Mr. Rosca.

ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: I'm not sure of the status of that.

MR. GOLDSHAW: It needs to be -- the discussion yesterday is we would come in this morning and present it to the panel so it could be admitted in part of the record. That's why I didn't want to close our case officially.

ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: Is there any objection to that?

MS. VERGOW: No objection.

ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: Okay. Declaration of Alan Rosca with the attachments will be admitted into evidence and made part of the record.

Its date is February 28, 2024. It's affirmed under penalty of perjury by Mr. Rosca, and it contains two attachments: Exhibit A, which goes to expenses, and Exhibit B, which goes to damages. Okay. That's admitted into the record.

(Rosca Declaration with Exhibits A and B offered and received in evidence.)

MR. GOLDSHAW: Okay. And if you have that handy, that was submitted this morning.

2.3

Oh, it is up on the PowerPoint. Thank
you. I have a wonderful team. It's on the
PowerPoint. It's a little too hard to read, So
I'm just going to try to describe it, because I
don't think we need to go over in detail here, but
when you do your deliberations, I want to make
sure that you understand the purpose of the
document and how it functions and how to use it.

It's really presented so that the panel can assess the damages in the case, and what it does is it first starts out with the deferred compensation awards. It goes claimant by claimant, and it lists out the total deferred compensation awards that was canceled from 2015 forward.

As a reminder, we had some discussion earlier on in the hearing. We stipulated to what is the damages, and we limited it to 2015 forward. And that's what this is. I'm trying to make it easier for the panel.

The next column is interest.

ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: Well, that column

Page 39 would be prejudgment interest, correct? 1 2 MR. GOLDSHAW: Correct. ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: The next column is 3 post-judgment interest, right? Or damages -- if 4 5 damages are assessed, then the interest with those damages, correct? 6 7 MR. GOLDSHAW: Yes. And the way -- I think we are saying the same thing, but just to be 8 9 clear, it's just so that you don't have to get out 10 our calculators and add the two numbers up. The third column is just adding the first two columns. 11 12 ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: We understand this document. Our question is what's the 13 justification. What is your --14 15 MR. GOLDSHAW: There's two. 16 ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: Okay. So what are they? 17 18 MR. GOLDSHAW: One is that the statute 19 under which we are proceeding, ERISA, specifically 20 allows for the award of attorneys' fees, which are 21 routinely awarded in ERISA cases. And secondly, the arbitrators' quide for 22 23 FINRA arbitrations. It's quide page 71, the cite 24 to ERISA. So that was the guide for the

arbitrators, page 71.

For ERISA, the statute we are proceeding under, it's 29 U.S.C. Section 1132, so G, as in Goldshaw, sub 1. There's case law. I guess I don't need to show evidence of case law, but you'll see they're routinely awarded in ERISA cases when claimants prevail. And it goes the one way. So when claimants prevail, the attorneys' fees will go to that.

Also, the cite showing that costs can be recovered in ERISA actions is 28 U.S.C.

Section 1920. I think it's actually really somewhat of a backup to costs. If you get to the first question to ERISA, we don't get costs twice, right? But the ERISA statute can cover that.

And, for example, there's the case for the appellate court in the same region as Judge Gardephe's decision, I'll just read this because I have a note passed to me from one of my colleagues who did some quickie research. In response to the panel's question, quote:

"In light of the ERISA fee provision's

'statutory purpose of vindicating retirement

rights granting a prevailing plaintiff's request

for fees is appropriate absent 'some particular justification for not doing so.'"

That case is Donachie, D-O-N-A-C-H-I-E, versus Liberty Life Insurance. The cite is 745 F.3rd, 41, at page 47, Second Circuit, 2014.

It's the kind of thing that you will see. So the statute itself talks about as an option the case law will provide that. Unless there's some compelling reason not to in light of the statutory provisions, attorneys' fees should be awarded.

And while I know I can't really ask questions during my closing argument, I hope I've addressed the questions I wrote down from the arbitrators, both as to the basis for attorneys' fees and costs, and explaining how the plan functioned in 2015 forward coming from the deferred compensation where it's coming from the commissions that were earned by the financial advisers.

ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: The one thing that wasn't addressed was -- and I know that you don't think it's relevant, but prior to 2015, did the pool of -- was there a change in where the deferred compensation came from, as far as if you

Page 42 know? 1 2 MR. GOLDSHAW: So this is my answer. 3 ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: I know you're going to say it's irrelevant. 4 5 MR. GOLDSHAW: No. You've heard me say that enough this week. I'm done saying that in 6 7 response to your questions. I am not going to do that. The answer is this: 8 9 In this case, we received the compensation 10 quide for 2014, but we did not focus discovery on 11 that period the way we did for 2015, so I'm a 12 little hesitant to go too deep. 13 But what I can tell you is that it was not the case for 2014, as it wasn't the system of what 14 15 they called a unified grid with the documents that 16 we showed you. And you don't remember the board 17 minutes? I didn't talk about that in my closing. 18 They specifically talk about the total payout and then there's the footnote that talks 19 20 about the earned commissions. I hope you remember 21 that. Can we get a --22 ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: That's okay. 23 MR. GOLDSHAW: Okay. So, but before 2014, 24 what we can see is the documents -- perhaps we

Page 43 could bring up the document again, where we show 1 2 that prior to 2015 we saw the word "bonus" all 3 over the place. 4 ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: Exactly. 5 MR. GOLDSHAW: So we are not going to argue if it was a bonus or not. We don't really 6 have that information that we would want to make 7 that -- we are not trying to make that argument, 8 9 but we are trying to rebut an argument that Morgan Stanley raised by what we contend is a 10 11 mischaracterization of our argument, and we are 12 doing our best to counter it, not because we think 13 it's relevant, but we don't want it to create confusion as we believe that confusion and 14 15 distraction has been the strategy we are trying to battle. 16 17 ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: Okav. 18 MR. GOLDSHAW: So, I will -- I'm sorry. 19 Have I finished addressing all the questions, just a little wrap-up? 20 21 ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: Sure. 22 MR. GOLDSHAW: Okay. So as I've been 23 arquing, Morgan Stanley has been encouraging you 24 throughout this hearing to ignore the Shafer

Page 44 decision, which is the law, or to second-quess it 1 2 or to decide for yourselves that it was somehow 3 wrong or mistaken, and I want to say respectfully that that is not appropriate in arbitration. 5 And, respectfully, the panel's duty is to apply the law, and Shafer is the law. 6 7 And make no mistake that when you cut to the core, Morgan Stanley is asking you to 8 9 disregard the law and, respectfully, a federal 10 court decision, if it is to be challenged, the 11 proper place to do that is in the federal courts, the federal appellate courts, and it is not within 12 13 the province of a panel in arbitration to overrule a federal court decision. 14 15 Thanks very much. 16 ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: Thank you. 17 You may proceed. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 18 MS. VERGOW: 19 CLOSING ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT 20 MS. VERGOW: Good morning, members of the 21 panel. I want to start by thanking you for 22 listening to the evidence and to the parties and

attention, we saw you taking notes, and we really

witnesses this week. We saw you paying close

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Page 92 make a rebuttal argument? 1 2 MR. GOLDSHAW: Yes, please. 3 ARBITRATOR SOLOCK: You may proceed. MR. GOLDSHAW: Thank you. 5 PLAINTIFF REBUTTAL CLOSING ARGUMENT MR. GOLDSHAW: Morgan Stanley just said 6 7 play by the rules of the game. ERISA sets the rules of the game. 8 9 Relying on the law in a federal court 10 ruling is not a "gotcha" argument. The decision 11 was not a radical departure. It was grounded in two appellate court opinions among lots of other 12 law. I don't want to pull up the opinion again. 13 It thoroughly reviewed the court case law in 14 15 reaching its decision. 16 And most importantly, it is the only 17 decision to rule on the specific -- it is the only 18 decision to rule on the specific plan at issue 19 here. 20 One thing that every case has in common, 21 that both parties have cited except for Shafer, is 22 they deal with different plans. Plans have 23 differences and variations. I mean, they get 24 amended every year. We have heard that, right?

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The exact plan that was considered in this case was considered in Shafer, and that is the law on that plan. We've heard, again, "a deal is a deal," and I'd like to complete the expression, "a deal is a deal unless it's illegal."

There's nothing in ERISA that provides that if an employer gets employees to agree to an unlawful vesting period that "a deal is a deal" supplants federal law, which dictates maximum vesting periods.

Employers can't get around the law by getting their employees to agree to it. They can't get around the law by having a disclaimer in their plans.

This plan is not subject to ERISA. If that were the case, I'm not sure every client would not be subject to ERISA. It would include the tag line. It's meaningless.

As tempting as it is to rebut the individual arguments that we just heard, I would like to just point out that all of the arguments you just heard were presented to and considered and analyzed and rejected by Judge Gardephe in Shafer. There's nothing new.

Do we know why we have been cut off of the meeting?

MS. CASALE: My Wi-Fi went out.

UMPIRE SOLOCK: I didn't do it.

MS. CASALE: My Wi-Fi cut out.

MR. GOLDSHAW: Ms. VerGow basically just made an appellate court argument to this panel and presented reasons why this panel should substitute its judgment on Morgan Stanley's plan for that of Judge Gardephe.

And while we are all capable of forming our own opinions, respectfully the role of the arbitration panel is to apply the law as it exists now, not to decide issues like an appellate court or to rule on the law as if you were the judge who had set the law.

Important people. I'm not trying to denigrate that, but there is the law out there, and the law is made by the courts, and it is clear on the plans at issue in this case.

Now, there was a lot of talk about bonuses, and, again, the reason why is, as was flashed on the board, there's a different standard for bonuses. And that's some of the confusion

that's created.

Let's start from the beginning. This is not a bonus plan. Judge Gardephe considered that issue. He spent pages of analysis on that issue. He reviewed the plans and the case law, and he ruled in a way that I can't put up on the screen right now: Point blank: This is not a bonus plan. End of story, clear as day. No strings attached. This is not a bonus plan. That is what is in the federal court decision.

So the statutes relating to bonuses and the cases are all a distraction because they're dealing with something else. I also have to call out that there was just a representation made to this panel about what a prior arbitration position decided and rejected arguments under ERISA.

Now, I continue to believe that the fact that there was no federal court ruling at that time is what matters most, but I also have to call out that FINRA decisions do not contain reasoned decisions, and the representation of what they decided or not under ERISA or the reasons for their decision is not supported in any way.

There is no way -- we can all take our

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guesses, but that's not -- it certainly is not a basis to disregard well-reasoned, firm opinions by federal court judges.

You heard again arguments about how important the deferred compensation plans are to Morgan Stanley, and, without regurgitating, wish to remind the panel that regardless of how important they consider them or not, there is no exception to the law to require compliance with the law based on how important it is.

It's as if to say, well, the law doesn't allow it, but I really, really, really want to do it, so, okay, then the law will bend. No, it doesn't work that way.

We heard, yet again, how the plan was communicated and the claimants understood the words. You saw that posted on the screen -- do we have access to the screen yet -- listed on the screen about how the complainants admitted that they understood the award.

Yes, without saying that, this is all just an excuse to point to evidence of things that are not at issue in the case. That has nothing to do with whether the vesting provisions comply with

Page 97 ERISA or not. 1 2 And I will tell you that respondent's 3 counsel has accused us of putting form over substance, you'll recall. And I can't help but 4 5 bring up and show you, if we have access to it, what Judge Gardephe said about the same arguments 6 7 that Morgan Stanley just made to this panel. MR. GOLDSHAW: Can we highlight that or is 8 9 that... 10 Let's get the whole paragraph. I want to 11 make sure the context is there. Thank you. 12 blue, but you can read it? 13 UMPIRE SOLOCK: Yes, I can. Can you read it? 14 15 ARBITRATOR GREENBERG: [Nonverbal 16 response.] 17 MR. GOLDSHAW: We can enlarge it. 18 Defendants are Morgan Stanley, right? 19 Defendants argue, however, that plaintiffs 20 did not earn payments under the compensation 21 incentive plan and equity incentive plan in 22 advance of receiving such payments. 23 By the way, exactly what you just heard 24 argued now, right?

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Continuing: Because financial advisers, quote, have no right to payment until and unless they remain employed at vesting - a condition plaintiffs did not meet, end quote.

Okay. Pause. Same argument you just heard right now from Morgan Stanley's counsel. There's the citation.

Defendants thus argue, that, quote, Morgan Stanley's program does not entail any, single quote, deferral of income by employees, single quote, end quote.

Again, same arguments you heard just now.

Judge Gardephe continues: This argument
is not persuasive because it exalts form over
substance.

Morgan Stanley is asking you to play the role of an appellate court. They are telling you point blank Shafer got it wrong I think were the exact words. You made a mistake.

That is asking you, as a FINRA arbitration panel, to disregard the law as it stands now, which is not appropriate to ask of a panel.

The law for these exact plans has been decided. They are not bonus plans. They are

ERISA plans. It's been decided. And their vesting periods are too long to comply with ERISA.

Counsel made a comment about they would be required to not pay out under ERISA. It's not true. It's not the law. I haven't heard that before, but I will tell you, they can put their money into a self-directed account, they can take money out, there's different tax consequences, but it's wrong to say that they couldn't access the money.

Again, it's a distraction. I almost wish I hadn't mentioned it just now because it's so far off the path of whether the plan at issue is governed by ERISA, which it is. We know that from the law.

Whether Morgan Stanley's plan complied with the vesting requirements, they were too long, we know that. And whether they cancelled the awards previously awarded to the claimants by relying on those illegal vesting provisions, and we know that they did, that's why we presented such a simple case of getting the plan documents before you, so you could see the terms of the plan, which is what you need to determine that, as

Judge Gardephe did, that it's governed by ERISA.

And we have simple, short testimony showing that these awards were granted and then canceled, due to the reliance on the illegal vesting provisions. That's it.

And so at the end of my comments I want to thank you for your time in this hearing, and my lasting comments, which I hope you will recall, is to pay careful attention, of course, to what is the law you're being asked to decide this case under, and what evidence and testimony have you seen relates to that decision, that simple three-part decision that, one, Judge Gardephe found is governed by ERISA; two, that the vesting provisions are too long, and, three, 1.5 million in deferred compensation awards were canceled by relying on those unlawful provisions.

Thank you.

UMPIRE SOLOCK: Thank you, both. The panel would, first of all, like to thank the attorneys in this case for their preparation and professionalism.

If we could be provided the documents that were promised us, because we are not going to be